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United States v. Henry: The Further Expansion
of the Criminal Defendant's Right to
Counsel During Interrogations
Despite the Burger Court's history of judicial conservatism, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Henry exceeds the liberality of the Warren Court
in the area of criminal defendant rights. The decision in Henry clearly
provides further limitations upon the government's ability to conduct inter-
rogations. The author examines the Court's factual and legal analysis of
the case, emphasizes how the test established in Henry surpasses the rule
promulgated in Massiah, and discusses the decision's impact as well as the
curious turnabout of Chief Justice Burger.
I. INTRODUCTION
It was Jonathan Swift who wrote that:
in all points out of their own trade they [lawyers] were the most ignorant
and stupid . . . among us, the most despicable in common conversation,
avowed enemies to all knowledge and learning, and equally disposed to
pervert the general reason of mankind in every other subject of discourse,
as in that of their own profession. 1
It is obvious that the United States Supreme Court places a
much higher value on the importance of attorneys than did
Jonathan Swift, as is evidenced by the recent ruling in the case of
United States v. Henry.2 In Henry, the Supreme Court expanded
the criminal defendant's right to counsel in the area of govern-
ment interrogation subsequent to the formal indictment.3 In
broadening the protections afforded the criminal defendant dur-
ing postindictment interrogations, the Burger Court expanded the
rights of the criminal defendant further than did the Warren
Court4 in the 1964 case of Massiah v. United States.5
1. J. Swi-r, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS 270 (Signet ed. 1960).
2. 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980).
3. Id. See also Mann, High Court Curtails Use of Informants, L.A. Times,
June 23, 1980, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Mann].
4. Chief Justice Warren was appointed by President Eisenhower, and served
as head of the high court from 1953 to 1969. Chief Justice Burger was appointed by
President Nixon, and has served as head of the high court since 1969. THE WORLD
ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 1980 312-13 (Newspaper Enterprise Ass'n ed. 1980).
5. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). However, Chief Justice Burger in Henry urged that
Massiah and Henry were indistinguishable as to their facts, and that the holding
in Henry was based on the rule created and applied in Massiah. 100 S. Ct. 2183,
2187 & n.10. But Justice Blackmun found Henry to be a definite breaking away
from the rule of Massiah. Whereas Massiah was concerned with actions moti-
The Court in Massiah held that any incriminating remarks de-
liberately elicited from an indicted defendant by government
agents, in the absence of the defendant's lawyer, deprived the de-
fendant of his right to counsel under the sixth amendment;6 and,
therefore, the defendant's statements could not be admitted into
evidence against him at his trial.7 But Henry has gone beyond
that test in holding that "by intentionally creating a situation
likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without
the assistance of counsel, the government violated Henry's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel."8 Thus, where the Massiah test ap-
peared only to cover situations where the government, or its
vated by a specific intent to draw incriminating statements from the defendant,
Justice Blackmun viewed Henry as going beyond that test by prohibiting mere
negligent reception of incriminating remarks. Id. at 2191 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing).
For Warren Court decisions in favor of the criminal defendant see, e.g., Benton
v. Md., 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy
held applicable to the states); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (what a
person attempts to protect as private, while even in a public area, is constitution-
ally protected by the fourth amendment); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) (right to counsel at postindictment lineups); Berger v. N.Y., 388 U.S. 41
(1967) (New York eavesdropping statute was found to be too broad, and thus un-
constitutional); Washington v. Tex., 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (sixth amendment right of
the accused to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses held applicable to
the states); Klopfer v. N.C., 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (sixth amendment right to speedy
trial held applicable to states); Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (anytime an
individual is taken into custody, or is significantly dispossessed of his freedom, his
privilege against self-incrimination is endangered and the police must read him
four warnings: 1) his right to remain silent; 2) the fact that anything he says can
be used against him; 3) that he has the right to the presence of an attorney; and 4)
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him if he so wishes);
Pointer v. Tex., 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right to confront opposing
witnesses held applicable to states); Escobedo v. fll., 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (confes-
sion acquired at police station before indictment was held to be a violation of the
accused's right to counsel, because the police investigation had progressed from
the stage of inquiry to the accusatory stage); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
(fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination held applicable to states);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (federal agents cannot, through the
use of informants, "deliberately elicit" incriminating statements from the accused
without the accused's counsel present); White v. Md., 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (the ac-
cused has a right to counsel at preliminary hearings); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel held applicable to states); Ham-
ilton v. Ala., 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (the accused has a right to counsel at arraign-
ments).
6. "[In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 206-07. The reason why such state-
ments are not allowed at trial is the exclusionary rule. The rule was solidified in
the case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), where the Court held that evidence
illegally seized was to be excluded from criminal trials. The rationale behind this
rule is that the uprightness of the American judicial system makes it necessary for
courts not to become involved in illegal intrusions into the constitutional rights of
citizens by allowing such unlawfully obtained evidence in at trial. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8. 100 S. Ct. at 2189 (emphasis added).
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agent, intentionally set out to extract incriminating statements
from the defendant, the Henry rule could apply to situations
where "negligent" events bring about damaging remarks.9
Even more important, the Burger Court has expressed the view
that it is the attorney himself who can better protect the individ-
ual's constitutional rights during interrogations by the govern-
ment. Contrary to Jonathan Swift's cynical portrayal of attorneys,
the United States Supreme Court in Henry sees attorneys as the
"guiding hand"'10 in preserving the rights of criminal defendants.
This paper will examine the history of the right to counsel,
present the facts of Henry, then examine the Supreme Court's ba-
sis for decision in the Henry case and compare it to the Court's
decision in the Massiah case. In addition, this paper will discuss
how the test established in Henry goes further than the test in
Massiah in protecting the criminal defendant. Lastly, the impact
of the Henry case, the debate over whether or not to extend crimi-
nal defendant's rights, the apparent about-face of Chief Justice
Burger in the Henry decision, and the future of the government's
use of informants will all be discussed.
II. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The right to counsel can be traced all the way back to the mid-
dle ages." Close to the end of the thirteenth century, three styles
of representation by counsel were available to defendants: the
lawyer as pleader,12 attornatus,' 3 and advocatus. 14 Until approxi-
9. Id. at 2191 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
10. The inexperience of the criminal defendant has been noted:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. . .[and] requires the guiding hand of counsel
at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much
more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (emphasis added). See also United States v.
Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307 (1973); Colemen v. Ala., 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223-25 (1967); Hamilton v. Ala., 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
11. P. LEWIS & K. PEOPLES, CONsTrrUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 549
(1979). Although, the concept of right to counsel in the middle ages covered a
much different area than the concept covers today.
12. A Pleader was someone "learned in the law who did not act as a represen-
tative of the defendant but merely stood at the defendant's side for his cause." Id.
13. An attornatus acted as the defendant's actual representative, appearing in
his place. Id.
14. The advocatus customarily made a case, not for the defendant's defense,
mately the middle of the fifteenth century, English law had al-
lowed the right to counsel considerable breadth and
prominence.15 But, two distinctions appeared in English law
which had the effect of suppressing and reining in the right to
counsel: the distinction between the presentation of questions of
law and fact, and the refusal to grant a defendant the guidance of
legal counsel when the defendant was accused of perpetrating a
felony.' 6 The facts-law distinction gave the task of presenting the
facts entirely to the defendant, whereas it was the attorney's nar-
row assignment to apply the law to the particular facts of the
case.17 While the defendant was disallowed access to legal coun-
sel in felony cases, he was, surprisingly, allowed the right to coun-
sel in misdemeanor cases. 18 During the next four centuries, the
right to counsel concept broadened "slowly but steadily." 9
Just prior to the American Revolution, three colonies 20 were
giving a broader view of the right to counsel than that accorded in
England. By 1789, the year Madison proposed the sixth amend-
ment,21 all states but Georgia and Rhode Island had some varia-
tion of the right to counsel in their constitutions, and eleven
states had abolished, either directly or impliedly, the facts-law
distinction altogether.22 In 1791, the sixth amendment was rati-
fied,23 and for nearly two hundred years its meaning has been de-
bated. 24 Until 1932, however, there were but a few cases touching
but for his own, because he primarily represented the defendant as a "surety or
warrantor." Id.
15. Id. at 549-50. See Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel
During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L. REV. 1000, 1032 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Historical Argument [.
16. P. LEwis, supra note 11, at 549-50.
17. Id. at 550. Consequently, the defendant was left on his own to do the
pleading witout the advantage of the lawyer's expertise. Id.
18. Id. See W. BEANY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-9 (1955).
The individual charged with a felony was deemed more hazardous to the English
Government. See also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 306-07 (1973).
19. P. LEwIS, supra note 11, at 550. By the eighteenth century, attorneys were
performing many more roles, excepting the opportunity to address the jury at the
close of the evidence, because that was left to the government's counsel exclu-
sively. Id.
20. Id. The three colonies were Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Delaware.
21. Historical Argument, supra note 15, at 1031.
22. P. LEWIS, supra note 11, at 550. See also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300,
306-07 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). See generally Powell
v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (general discussion of right to counsel history).
23. Historical Argument, supra note 15, at 1031. The amendment passed both
Houses without debate.
24. The basic lack of historical data and material, in regard to Congress's in-
tent in ratifying the sixth amendment, makes it an arduous task to determine just
what the scope of the right to counsel was meant to encompass. Each state could
adopt the amendment as a guarantee to the right to counsel already enjoyed
under each state's particular constitution. Thus, it was left to the courts to deter-
mine if the amendment provided a broader interpretation of the right to counsel
[Vol. 8: 451, 19811 United States v. Henry
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upon the right to counsel.25
Beginning with Powell v. Alabama,26 the United States
Supreme Court has made a number of rulings pertaining to the
sixth amendment and the right to assistance of counsel, with the
cumulative effect of further expanding the rights of the criminal
defendant.27
than was available under a particular state's constitution. W. BEANY, supra note
18, at 24.
United States courts often expand the right to counsel to meet new situations
that arise which present confrontations requiring further legal assistance for the
criminal defendant. See generally United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 311 (1973)
(discussion concerning new contexts presenting same hazards which gave rise to
right to counsel in the first place).
25. Historical Argument, supra note 15, at 1031. It was not until the United
States became highly industrialized and urbanized that there arose a problem of
the indigent defendant and, in addition, the investigation process of the law en-
forcement community became more complex.
26. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Court held that a criminal defendant had a right to
the assistance of counsel in a case involving a capital offense where the ignorance
or lack of clear-thinking on the part of the accused made the accused unable to
present an adequate defense. Id. at 71.
The Court in Powell relied upon the fourteenth amendment. It was not until
Massiah that American courts began relying directly upon the sixth amendment
in right to counsel cases. P. LEWIS, supra note 11, at 420. In Massiah, the Court
looked explicitly at the sixth amendment, whereas all previous decisions involving
right to counsel had relied upon the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Those cases relying upon the fourteenth amendment looked to whether or
not the denial of counsel constituted fundamental unfairness in the criminal proc-
ess for the accused. For decisions relying upon the fourteenth amendment see
Hamilton v. Ala., 368 U.S. 52, 52 (1961); Spano v. N.Y., 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959);
Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 508 (1958); Crooker v. Cal., 357 U.S. 433, 434 (1958);
Payne v. Ark., 356 U.S. 560, 561 (1958); Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
27. Since the landmark case of Powell, the United States Supreme Court has
made many decisions affecting the criminal defendant's right to counsel. The
Court established the right to court-appointed counsel at federal trials. Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (two marines were tried and convicted for feloniously
uttering and passing counterfeit bills, and though they asked the district attorney
for court-appointed counsel at trial, they were denied their request).
The Court granted the right to be free from coerced confessions. Spano v. N.Y.,
360 U.S. 315 (1959). In Spano, the defendant was convicted for the murder of a for-
mer professional boxer, who had previously beaten the defendant at a saloon and
stolen his money. The defendant turned himself in to the authorities, and, after
eight hours of questioning, confessed. During those eight hours the police had
used a friend of the defendant's, a police cadet, to arouse the defendant's compas-
sion, by having the friend falsely claim that unless the defendant confessed, he,
the friend, would be in serious trouble. Looking at the totality of the circum-
stances, the Court found a coerced confession. Id. at 316-20, 323.
The Court has given the defendant the right to counsel at arraignments. White
v. Md., 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Ala., 368 U.S. 52 (1961). In White, the defend-
ant had initially made a plea of guilty, but later at his arraignment, this time with
counsel present, the defendant pleaded not guilty. While his not guilty plea was
Permeating the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
in connection with the defendant's right to counsel is the theory
of "critical stages." 28 If the particular stage in the criminal proc-
allowed to stand, the fact that he had previously pleaded guilty was admitted into
evidence at trial. The Court held that the original guilty plea should not have been
admitted at trial, because the plea was obtained at a time where the right to coun-
sel attached, due to the reason that counsel was required to be present so the de-
fendant could plead intelligently. 373 U.S. at 59-60. In Hamilton, the defendant
was charged with burglary and he was denied counsel for his arraignment. Under
Alabama law, the arraingment was the only time a defendant could assert the de-
fense of insanity; thus the Court reasoned that since the arraignment was such an
important stage, where significant opportunities could be eternally lost, the de-
fendant had a right to counsel at such proceedings. 368 U.S. at 52-55.
The right to court-appointed counsel at all felony trials was established by the
Court. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, the defendant was
charged with the burglary of a poolhall, and, despite his indigency, he was denied
his request for court-appointed counsel at trial. Thus, the defendant handled his
own defense, and was subsequently convicted and sentenced to five years in
prison. Id. at 336-37.
The right to counsel after indictment whenever the government interrogates the
defendant was instituted in Massiah, and relied upon in Henry. 100 S. Ct., at 2186-
88.
The Court has applied the right to counsel whenever the process becomes accu-
satory, rather than investigatory, and the government interrogates the defendant.
Escobedo v. Ill., 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In Escobedo, the defendant's brother-in-law
had been shot and killed, and eleven days later the defendant was arrested for
that shooting and taken to the police station for questioning. The defendant made
many pleas to see his lawyer, but was repeatedly denied access to counsel. In re-
versing the conviction, the Court found that the defendant's right to counsel under
the sixth and fourteenth amendments had been denied. Id. at 479-83, 491.
The Court established the right to court-appointed counsel during custodial
(versus postindictment) interrogation. Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (any-
time an individual is taken into custody, or is significantly dispossessed of his
freedom, his privilege against self-incrimination is endangered and the police
must warn him about his right to remain silent, the fact that anything he says can
be used against him, his right to the presence of an attorney during questioning,
and his right to have the court appoint an attorney if he cannot afford one).
The right to counsel has been extended to postindictment lineups by the Court.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). In Wade, the defendant was indicted
for the robbery of a bank, and without notifying his counsel, the government
placed the defendant in a line-up, where the defendant was identified as the rob-
ber. The Court reversed the subsequent conviction on the grounds that since the
absence of counsel at that proceeding could cause the trial to be unfair, the de-
fendant was entitled to the assistance of counsel at the lineup. Id. at 219-21, 224.
The Court has instituted the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing. Coleman
v. Ala., 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (the preliminary hearing was held to be such a crucial
stage for the defendant in the criminal process, that he had the same right to
counsel at that stage as he had at the trial itself).
The right to counsel for all crimes punishable by a prison sentence has been es-
tablished by the Court. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (the court held
that it could not read anything in the sixth amendment justifying a distinction be-
tween misdemeanors and felonies).
In addition, the Court has applied the right to counsel when the government,
even indirectly, interrogates the defendant after the defendant has been formally
charged with an offense. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). For a synopsis of
the Brewer facts see note 78 infra.
28. See text accompanying notes 69-71 infra.
[Vol. 8: 451, 1981] United States v. Henry
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ess is deemed to be critical, then the defendant has the right to
counsel at that time.2 9 However, if the stage is not determined to
be critical, then no right to the assistance of counsel attaches. 30
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES V. HENRY
A bank in Norfolk, Virginia was robbed by two men wearing
masks and carrying guns, while a third man waited in a car
outside. The car used for the robbers' escape was discovered
shortly thereafter abandoned. A lease and rental receipt, for a
rented house in Norfolk, was found in the car. This discovery led
to the subsequent arrest of two men at the rented house.3 1 Impli-
cated by the rental receipt, Billy Gale Henry was arrested three
months later and indicted for armed robbery.32 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Henry was given appointed counsel.
A Mr. Nichols, who was imprisoned in the same cellblock as
Henry, and who was sometimes paid on a contingent basis for giv-
ing information to the FBI, was requested to be on guard to any
statements made by prisoners, particularly Henry, but not to initi-
ate any conversations concerning the charges against them. 33 A
29. See, e.g., Coleman v. Ala., 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearing is a critical
stage because it could have a prejudicial effect on the trial); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (line-up is a critical stage so as to insure that the trial
will be fair); Escobedo v. Ill., 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (when the criminal process be-
comes accusatory, whether or not there is an indictment, it is a critical stage when
the defendant is interrogated); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (pos-
tindictment interrogations of the defendant constitute critical stages); White v.
Md., 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (preliminary hearing is a critical stage to insure intelligent
pleading by the defendant); Hamilton v. Ala., 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (arraignment is a
critical stage because what happens there could have effect on trial); Crooker v.
Cal., 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (if a pretrial proceeding without counsel would substan-
tially prejudice the defendant at trial, then the right to counsel attaches at that
proceeding); Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (some pretrial stages are as critical
as the trial itself).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (photo display is not a
critical stage); Kirby v. Ill., 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (preindictment showup is not a criti-
cal stage because formal proceedings against the defendant have not been initi-
ated); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (taking of blood and fingerprints
are not critical stages); Gilbert v. Cal., 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplar is
not a critical stage because there is only a minimal chance that it will make the
trial unfair).
31. The government agents found the money from the robbery, the masks, and
the guns used in the robbery at the rented house. 100 S. Ct. at 2184.
32. Henry was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)(d) (1976).
33. The government agent involved submitted an affidavit describing his rela-
tionship and conversation with Nichols, the paid informant:
I recall telling Nichols ... to be alert to any statements made there by in-
month or so later, Nichols was released from jail and reported
what Henry had told him about the bank robbery. Nichols was
paid for giving such information.
At Henry's trial, evidence was admitted regarding Henry's con-
nection to the rental receipt, along with testimony linking Henry
to the rented house and the other two men in the robbery. Evi-
dence was also admitted indicating it was Henry's palm prints
fouid on the lease agreement. Finally, the informant, Nichols,
testifid in reference to the incriminating statements made by
Henry to him in their conversations.
Henry was convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to a term
of twenty-five years in prison. On appeal, he raised no sixth
amendment claim 34 and his conviction was affirmed. Upon subse-
quent appeal, Henry asserted that Nichols' testimony had consti-
tuted a violation of his right to assistance of counsel. The district
court, however, ruled against Henry. The appellate court reversed
the lower court and found that there had been a violation of
Henry's sixth amendment right.35
IV. THE MASSIAH TEST AND THE HENRY FACTS
In Massiah, the defendant, a merchant seaman, was arrested
when the United States Government agents found three and a
half pounds of cocaine aboard ship. The defendant was ar-
raigned 36 and indicted, along with a co-defendant, and released on
bail following his having retained a lawyer. The co-defendant, de-
ciding to cooperate with the federal agents, allowed those agents
to place a listening device under his automobile's front seat for
the purpose of recording conversations with the defendant; the
co-defendant was directed to elicit information. The defendant di-
vulged the incriminating remarks sought after, and was subse-
dividuals [the federal prisoners] regarding the charges against them. I
,specifically recall telling Nichols that he was not to question Henry or
these individuals about the charges against them, however, if they en-
gaged him in conversation or talked in front of him, he was requested to
pay attention to their statements.
100 S. Ct. at 2185-86.
34. It was not until some time after his initial appeal that Henry discovered
the fact that Nichols was a paid government informer, thus Henry's appeal on
sixth amendment grounds was somewhat belated. Id. at 2185.
35. In reversing and remanding the lower court, the appellate court relied
upon Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The appellate court held that if
Nichols had created a confidential and trustworthy relationship with Henry,
through ordinary conversation or association or both, so as to lead Henry to make
damaging statements, then Henry's sixth amendment right to counsel was in-
fringed upon. 590 F.2d 544 (1978).
36. The defendant pleaded not guilty. 377 U.S. at 202.
[Vol. 8: 451, 19811 United States v. Henry
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quently convicted.3 7 In reversing the defendant's conviction,3 8 the
United States Supreme Court held that the government had delib-
erately elicited incriminating comments from the defendant in
the absence of counsel and after indictment, and therefore, had
violated his sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel.39
Hence, Massiah established the rule that the government cannot
interrogate a defendant, whether directly or indirectly,40 without
the defendant's counsel present after a defendant has been in-
dicted.41
In finding Massiah to be controlling, 42 the Henry Court noted
the presence of three elements which led to the Court's conclu-
sion that a deliberate elicitation had occurred: first, Nichols was
acting as an informant on a contingent fee basis; second, Nichols
was "ostensibly" no more than a fellow prisoner in Henry's eyes;
and, third, Henry was under indictment and imprisoned when he
made his incriminating statements. 43 After examination, how-
ever, each element of the Court's conclusion, and hence, the con-
clusion itself, may be seen to be less than satisfactory.
37. See generally statement of facts, Id. at 202-03.
38. Id. at 207.
39. Id. at 206. The Massiah decision marked a departure from the United
States Supreme Court's reliance on the voluntariness test in determining the ad-
missibility of confessions. Id. at 210, 213 (White, J., dissenting) (absence of coun-
sel is but one of many factors to consider). See also Escobedo v. Ill., 378 U.S. 478,
492, 496 (1964). For decisions relying on the voluntariness test see Spano v. N.Y.,
360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959); Payne v. Ark., 356 U.S. 560, 562, 567 (1958).
The Court in Spano looked at all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
confession in determining if it was voluntary. 360 U.S. at 321. The cases following
the voluntariness test did not address the question of whether or not the defend-
ant was allowed the presence of counsel during interrogation, nor did Massiah and
Escobedo focus on whether or not the confession was voluntary. Quite possibly,
the voluntariness test was abandoned because it was deemed inadequate protec-
tion for the defendant in that it gave the trial court too much discretion in deter-
mining whether the confession was voluntary or not, which would lead to a
complete lack of uniformity in decisions. See generally Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
40. 377 U.S. at 206. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 400 (1977) (the fact
that the incriminating remarks were directly elicited in Massiah, but indirectly
elicited in Brewer, was deemed constitutionally irrelevant). See also R.I. v. Innis,
100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980). See generally Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and
Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L. REV. 1 (1978).
41. Such postindictment elicitation of incriminating remarks requires a rever-
sal of conviction based on such evidence. 377 U.S. at 204. See People v. Waterman,
9 N.Y.2nd 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 449, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961). See generally J. KLOTrER
& J. KANOVITZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR POLICE 387 (3d ed. 1977).
42. 100 S. Ct. at 2186.
43. Id.
A. The Contingent Fee Arrangement
Because Nichols was acting on a contingent fee basis, the Court
reasoned, he was only to be paid upon his providing information
which, despite the agent's instructions not to initiate any conver-
sations but only to listen, would impel Nichols to take positive
steps to obtain incriminating information.H However, in its analy-
sis the Court disregarded some key factors which, when consid-
ered together, would lead to an assumption contrary to that of the
majority. Those key factors included the agents specific instruc-
tions to Nichols,45 the assumption that Nichols would not be paid
unless he followed the instructions given,46 the fact that Nichols
had worked for the FBI for four years, and the fact that Nichols
was to be attentive to the conversations of many prisoners, not
just Henry's. 47 Considering the above factors, the Court placed it-
self on unstable ground when it determined that the federal
agent, in having a contingent fee arrangement with Nichols,
thereby "intentionally created a situation likely to induce Henry
to make incriminating statements." While there was evidence to
support the Court's inference, there was equal evidence to sup-
port a competing inference,4 8 i.e., that Nichols did, in fact, follow
the specific instructions given him and thus only listened to
Henry incriminate himself. Had the Court so ruled, no interroga-
tion could have been shown to have occurred, and hence, there
could have been no denial of the right to counsel at the time
Henry made his incriminating remarks to Nichols.
In relying upon the contingent fee arrangement, the Court in
Henry rested its decision on more dubious rationale than that
found in Massiah. In Massiah, the informant, a co-defendant, had
a strong motive to enter into an arrangement with the police to
specifically elicit incriminating remarks from Massiah. 49 The in-
formant in Massiah, therefore, had a direct and primary focus of
44. Id. at 2187. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, as-
sumed there was such a contingent fee scheme on the basis of Nichols being paid
in the past at the time he produced information, rather than constantly remaining
on the FBI payroll. Id. at 2187 n.7. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, however, re-
fused to find that such a scheme ever existed, as the lower court had made no
such finding. Id. at 2193.
45. See note 33 supra.
46. Does an individual truly expect payment for completing an assignment in
a manner contrary to the instructions? This author would answer in the negative.
47. 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2194 & n.9, (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (a discussion of the
factors mentioned in the text). The fact that Nichols had worked so long for the
FBI gives rise to the presumption that the FBI had been pleased with his work
and that he had followed instructions.
48. Id. Also, the intentional creation of such a situation was seen by the ma-
jority as tantamount to interrogation. 100 S. Ct. at 2189. But see notes 55, 59 infra.
49. 377 U.S. at 202-03.
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attention on Massiah in particular. Nichols, the informant in
Henry, was told to be alert for remarks made by many prisoners,
not just Henry.SO Thus, in spite of the fact that Nichols would re-
ceive payment for providing information, there is no proof to sup-
port the Court's belief that Nichols's general desire to receive
money payments would lead him to specifically violate the in-
structions given him and single out Henry, from among the many
prisoners, from whom to elicit information.
B. Nichols Was Ostensibly a Fellow Prisoner
The involuntary waiver of counsel issue is probably the strong-
est ground on which the Court reached its result since the use of
undisclosed informants precludes the possibility of the existence
of a valid waiver of the right to counsel. The United States
Supreme Court has established four major criteria in determining
if such a waiver has occurred.
First, every reasonable presumption is taken against the exist-
ence of a waiver. 51 Second, a waiver of the right to counsel during
interrogation must be done knowingly and intelligently, with full
understanding of the nature of that act.52 Third, a waiver cannot
be presumed from a silent record.53 Fourth, it is the government's
burden to prove a waiver.54 When applying these standards to the
Henry case it becomes obvious that, if in fact an interrogation did
occur,5 5 there could not have been any such waiver. At least with
known government agents a defendant is able to deal with the
government at "arm's length," but with an undercover agent, as
with Nichols, it can be assumed that the defendant would not
have revealed any information if he had known he was conversing
50. See note 33 supra.
51. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 404 (1977); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.
506, 514 (1962); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
52. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
53. Id.
54. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 402-03 (1977).
55. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, questions the majority's de-
termination that an interrogation even took place. 100 S. Ct. at 2203. If no interro-
gation, or elicitation of information, occurred, then the question of whether or not
a valid waiver took place is moot because not every attempt by the government to
acquire evidence, or every conversation the government has with a criminal de-
fendant, is interrogation. United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1347-48 (9th Cir.
1977) (mere listening does not constitute interrogation).
with the government. 56 In sum, a waiver of right to counsel is
simply inapplicable when conversations with an unknown under-
cover government agent occur.5 7
Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, would contend that the
question of waiver should never have been raised 58 by the Court
for the reason that the few facts presented just as easily point to
an assumption that no interrogation occurred at all. 59 This case
could be seen simply as the situation where a defendant has erro-
neously placed his confidence in another prisoner not to reveal
his wrongdoing.60 The facts are such that Henry could have initi-
ated the conversations with Nichols himself, on a voluntary basis,
without Nichols having done any prodding whatsoever.6 1
C. Imprisonment Itself Makes a Defendant More Susceptible to
the Strategies of Informants
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Henry, wrote
that "the mere fact of custody imposes pressures on the accused;
confinement may bring into play subtle influences that will make
him particularly susceptible to the ploys of undercover govern-
ment agents." 62 The Court recognized the strong psychological
pressures which compel prisoners to reach out to those around
them for aid.63 Henry's need to reach out, especially to one shar-
ing a common predicament, enabled Nichols to earn Henry's re-
spect and confidence, and consequently, elicit incriminating
56. 100 S. Ct. at 2188.
57. Id.
58. See note 55 supra.
59. There simply are not enough facts present to make a determination either
way. 100 S. Ct. at 2193-95. See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
60. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). This decision was based on
the rationale that one's voluntary statements found no protection in the sixth
amendment. Id. at 304. However, Hoffa was held not to apply to situations where
the defendant had already been indicted; in those cases, an informer could not
elicit incriminating remarks from the defendant in the absence of counsel. In
Hoffa, the defendant had not been indicted at the time he made incriminating re-
marks to the undercover agent. Id. at 309. Nevertheless, both Justices Blackmun
and Rehnquist, in their dissents in Henry, found the Hoffa concept of "misplaced
belief' applicable to the Henry case. 100 S. Ct. at 2192, 2199. If it is assumed that
Nichols did in fact follow the specific instructions given him, then the Hoffa rule
may indeed be applicable, for the reason that Henry then would have made the
remarks to Nichols as a result of his voluntary decision to do so, knowing very well
that Nichols could possibly relay such remarks to the police.
61. Possibly, the Henry Court found that the couplet, "[ain open foe may
prove a curse, but a pretended friend is worse," is worthy of sixth amendment
right to counsel protection despite the fact that the "pretended friend" did not
elicit incriminating remarks. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) (quoting
John Gay).
62. 100 S. Ct. at 2188.
63. Id. See Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 448-54 (1966).
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information.64 The fact that incarceration makes one more willing
to talk, however, cannot make a voluntary statement any less vol-
untary.
In summary, the Henry Court, in finding an interrogation pres-
ent, drew too much from the available facts, and in so doing, es-
tablished a rule far too broad. 65 As Justice Powell suggested in
his concurrence, the case would have been far less troublesome
had an evidentiary hearing been held regarding the Massiah
claim.66 If such an evidentiary hearing had been conducted, the
Court would have had a stronger foundation in determining
whether or not Nichols acted to elicit information after receiving
his special instructions, and such a hearing would have brought
forth evidence and testimony establishing his precise instruc-
tions.
V. THE COURT'S USE OF THE "CRITICAL STAGE" RATIONALE
Since the landmark decision of Powell v. Alabama, the United
States Supreme Court has examined postindictment confronta-
tions between defendants and government agents "to determine
whether they are 'critical stages' of the prosecution at which the
64. The fact that Henry asked Nichols to participate in an escape from jail evi-
dences the respect and trust Henry had placed in Nichols. 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2189 &
n.12.
There is a contrary view, however, which finds the pressures of incarceration too
minute to make a difference. Justice Blackmun, in his Henry dissent, noted that
"official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day," 100 S. Ct. at 2194
(quoting Lanza v. N.Y., 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962)). He noted further that prisoners
are aware of the fact that many of their jailmates, in seeking their own interests,
offer to assist the authorities. 100 S. Ct. at 2194.
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist said that "[an appeal to an accused's con-
science or willingness to talk ... does not . . . have a sufficiently overbearing im-
pact on the accused's will to warrant special constitutional protection." Id. at 2203.
See also R.I. v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1692 (1980).
65. The author is not of the opinion that the rule of Henry is per se too sweep-
ing, but rather that it is not compatible with the particular facts of the Henry case.
See 100 S. Ct. at 2193 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 2201-03 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). The rule in Henry would be more compatible with a different scenario of
facts. If the federal agents had not given Nichols specific instructions prohibiting
him from eliciting information from Henry, but rather had just told Nichols that
they would generally like to have such incriminating statements from Henry, then
the test created in Henry would be applicable. In that situation, the federal agents
would have created a situation likely to induce Henry to incriminate himself, but,
to the contrary, they merely created a situation whereby Nichols might be able to
listen to voluntary confessions made by Henry.
66. Id. at 2190.
Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel attaches. ' 67
The Court in Henry found that Nichols had deliberately elicited
incriminating information from Henry resulting in a usurpation of
Henry's constitutional right to counsel. Its opinion might have
been a stronger one had it spoken to the "critical stages" issue.68
Over the years, three criteria have been used in determining
whether a confrontation constitutes a "critical stage." First, the
courts determine whether or not the particular confrontation cre-
ated the possibility of unfairness in the subsequent trial if coun-
sel were not allowed to be present.69 Second, the courts inquire
as to whether or not counsel would have any opportunity to cure,
at trial, any defects arising out of a postindictment confrontation,
if counsel were not present at the particular confrontation. 70
Third, the courts ask whether or not counsel is needed at a partic-
ular stage to assist the defendant in coping with legal problems or
in meeting the adversary. 7 1
Applying the above criteria to Henry would result in no other
conclusion than that the alleged interrogation of Henry was a
"critical stage." The fact that Nichols was viewed as working un-
dercover as a government agent while outwardly appearing only
as a prisoner points to what may be considered an unjust advan-
tage over Henry, with the possible result that the ensuing trial
was unfair for Henry. Further, as to whether or not incurable de-
fects arose from any postindictment confrontation in the Henry
case, that would be a question of witness credibility at trial. The
safest rule in terms of the defendant's rights would require the
presence of counsel at any and all interrogations, whether they be
direct or surreptitious. Lastly, it cannot be doubted that every
postindictment interrogation involves problems for the defendant
in handling legal questions and in confronting the adversary.
VI. THE HENRY TEST: AN EXTENSION OF MASSIAH
Although the majority in Henry made the claim that the case is
67. Id. at 2186. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 311, 313, 315-16
(1973); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 226-28, 231-32 (1967); Powell v. Ala.,
287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
68. However, this is assuming that the existence of a postindictment confron-
tation between the government and Henry was proven, which this author believes
has not conclusively been shown. See note 55 supra.
69. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 311 (1973); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967); Escobedo v. Ill., 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964) (referring to Hamil-
ton v. Ala., 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961)).
70. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 315-16 (1973); Coleman v. Ala., 399
U.S. 1, 9-11 (1970) (quoting from United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)).
71. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 313 (1973); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
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indistinguishable from Massiah,72 the holding in the Henry case
goes further, and thus encompasses the factual distinction that
truly did exist.
In Massiah,73 the federal agents urged the informant to engage
in conversation with the defendant, 74 with the hope of drawing in-
criminating remarks from him. The federal agents had deliber-
ately and designedly set out to obtain incriminating remarks from
the defendant in the absence of defendant's counsel.75 The word
"deliberately," used in the Massiah test, indicates intent.7 6 Thir-
teen years after Massiah, the Supreme Court, in the decision
Brewer v. Williams,77 found that the "Christian Burial" 78 speech,
though indirect as it was, represented a scheme to "deliberately
72. See note 5 supra. See generally Mann, supra note 3, at 1, 15.
73. The Massiah case relied on a series of New York cases. See generally Peo-
ple v. Davis, 13 N.Y.2d 690, 191 N.E.2d 674, 241 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1963); People v. Rodri-
guez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 183 N.E.2d 651, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962); People v. Meyer, 11
N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962); People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d
561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961); People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166
N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960); People v. Swanson, 18 A.D.2d 832, 237 N.Y.S.2d
400 (1963); People v. Price, 18 A.D.2d 739, 235 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1962); People v. Wal-
lace, 17 A.D.2d 981, 234 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1962); People v. Karmel, 17 A.D.2d 659, 230
N.Y.S.2d 413 (1962); People v. Robinson, 16 A.D.2d 184, 224 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962).
74. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 202-03 (1964). See 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2187
n.10.
75. 377 U.S. at 206.
76. Id. See 100 S. Ct. at 2191 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
78. In Brewer, the defendant was arrested in Davenport, Iowa for the abduc-
tion of a ten-year-old girl, who was missing after her brother's wrestling match at a
YMCA in Des Moines, Iowa. Accompanied by two police officers, the defendant
was driven from Davenport to Des Moines. During that trip, one of the police of-
ficers made the "Christian Burial" speech:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down
the road .... Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions,
it's raining, it's sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility
is poor, it's going to be dark early this evening. They are predicting sev-
eral inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you, yourself are the only
person that knows where this little girl's body is, that you yourself have
only been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may
be unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on the
way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that
the parents of the little girl should be entitled to a christian burial for the
little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and
murdered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way rather than
waiting until morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm and
possibly not being able to find it at all... I do not want you to answer me.
I don't want to discuss it any further. Just think about it as we're riding
down the road.
430 U.S. at 392-93. Shortly thereafter, the defendant led the officers to the little
girl's body. Id. at 393.
and designedly ... elicit information from [the defendant]."79
The holdings in these two cases, focus on the intent of the govern-
ment to deliberately elicit, whether through direct questioning or
oblique persuasion, incriminating statements from the defendant
after he has been indicted and in the absence of counsel. These
holdings are, primarily, based on the rationale that the defendant
is denied counsel at the precise time he needs counsel the most.80
In contrast, the government agent, in Henry, gave the informant
specific instructions not to question the defendant nor engage the
defendant in any conversation pertaining to his part in the
crime.81 Such restricted instructions point to the assumption that
the government did not deliberately and designedly plan to elicit
incriminating information from the defendant, but merely hoped
that the informant would have the opportunity to listen to some
voluntary admissions made by the defendant.82 In Henry, the
Court created a newly-worded test: "By intentionally creating a
situation likely to induce [the defendant] to make incriminating
statements without the assistance of counsel, the government vio-
lated [the defendant's] Sixth Amendment right to counsel."83
Consequently, "while claiming to retain the 'deliberately elicited'
test, the court really forges a new test that saps the word 'deliber-
ately' of all significance. The court's extension of Massiah would
cover even a 'negligent' triggering of events resulting in reception
of disclosures." 84
To put the subject in another light, the difference between the
test created in Henry and the test established in Massiah can be
ascertained through an examination of the stages involved in
each rule. There are two stages in the "deliberate elicitation"
standard of Massiah, whereas the "intentionally creating a situa-
tion likely to induce" formula of Henry may be divided into three
stages. The first stage in Massiah is represented by the word "de-
liberate," inferring a design or purpose, or, more specifically, an
intent to evoke incriminating statements from a defendant, in the
absence of counsel. The next stage, "elicitation," involves the act
of interrogation, whether directly or indirectly, of the defendant
so as to effectuate the intent of the first stage. Thus, the Massiah
test simply consists of the intent element coupled with the actual
exercise of elicitation.
79. Id. at 399.
80. Id. at 398. 377 U.S. at 205.
81. See note 33 supra.
82. See 100 S. Ct. at 2196-201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 2201-02 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Contra, id. at 2187.
83. Id. at 2189 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 2191 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The first stage in Henry is closely related to the first stage of
Massiah. In Henry, that stage is represented by the word "inten-
tionally," which connotes having a plan in mind. The principal
difference between the two tests rests on what the intent of the
first stage focuses on in the second stage. In Massiah, that intent
focuses on the act of elicitation itself, but in Henry, that intent
does not center on the act of extracting information; rather, it con-
centrates on the creation of a situation which would likely lead to
the inducement of incriminating remarks. Consequently, under
the Massiah rule the government cannot, through its officials,
agents, or informants, intentionally question the defendant in the
absence of counsel. However, under the Henry rule, the govern-
ment, in its use of informants, cannot even create circumstances
whereby the defendant may possibly be induced by the informant
to make incriminating statements. In other words, if the govern-
ment does not take every precaution to insure that the informant
does not elicit such incriminating remarks, then the government
will be found to have elicited such remarks, whether it truly did
so or not.85 The third stage of the Henry test is the actual induce-
ment of incriminating statements from the defendant in the ab-
sence of counsel, which, as mentioned, is assumed if the
government improperly sent the informant into close proximity
with the defendant, after the indictment of the defendant. Thus,
in contrast to Massiah, Henry places an extra burden or duty on
the government.
Further evidence of Henry's expanded test is found in the high
court's repudiation of the argument found in the Justice Depart-
ment's legal brief:
Only when the government has directed the informant to question the ac-
cused, or has placed the informant in a situation where incriminating
statements are likely to be overheard without adequately instructing
him,8 6 should the government be held to have "deliberately elicited"
85. Which, in effect, says that the government cannot use informants to obtain
incriminating statements from a defendant, in the absence of defendant's counsel,
after the defendant has been indicted. Mann, supra note 3, at 1, 15, col. 1. This is
considered to be the case, because in Henry the fact that the federal agents gave
Nichols specific instructions not to elicit incriminating comments was deemed in-
sufficient by the Court. 100 S. Ct. at 2187. However, if Nichols had not been on a
contingent fee arrangement with the government, but rather had acted for no fee,
then the Court might possibly have assumed that Nichols would not have been
motivated to defy his orders and deliberately question Henry.
86. "Without adequately instructing him" is presumed to mean the failure to
instruct the informant to refrain from questioning the defendant and merely act as
a passive listener. Without such instructions, there would be no way to impress
statements that are made in response to the informant's questions.
8 7
From what can be read of the new test promulgated in Henry, it
unmistakably goes beyond the test of Massiah and Brewer, but as
to how far beyond, only the future will tell.88
VII. IMPACT
A. The Debate over the Policy of Balancing Will Continue
As enunciated in the case of Spano v. New York, 89 there is an
underlying conflict in every dispute involving the rights of crimi-
nal defendants.90 It is an encounter between two essential inter-
ests of society: at one extreme is the interest of competent and
quick law enforcement and at the other is the interest in prohib-
iting encroachment in the area of individual rights by unconstitu-
tional means of law enforcement. 91
On the side of law enforcement, it has been argued that requir-
ing counsel's presence destroys the importance of interrogations
and cripples effective law enforcement by setting criminals free.92
Society is made to suffer by broadening criminal defendant's
rights, and the search for truth is seriously hindered.93 On the
other side of the balance, it has been argued that law enforcement
officials have a duty to obey the law while enforcing it, because
life and liberty can be destroyed as much by wrongful police
methods as by criminals themselves. 94 A system of criminal law
which depends on confessions, rather than other forms of evi-
dence, is apt to suffer more abuses and be less trustworthy.95
It is very unlikely that the decision handed down in Henry will
stifle this underlying conflict of criminal law; in fact, the decision
upon the informant that he is to avoid questioning the defendant at all costs. See
generally note 33 supra.
87. Mann, supra note 3, at 15, col. 1.
88. A few weeks before Henry, the Supreme Court established a definition of
an interrogation, in respect to a Miranda custody question, in the case of R.I. v.
Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1691 (1980): "the definition of interrogation can extend only
to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Id. at 1690 (emphasis in
original). Despite the fact that Innis held that this definition was "not necessarily
interchangeable" with Brewer and Massis, Id. at 1689 n.4, the similarity of the test
established in Henry appears to be more than accidental.
89. 360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959).
90. Id.
91. For further discussion in this area, see Historical Argument, supra note 15,
at 1048-49.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., 100 S. Ct. at 2192 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 207-08 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
94. Spano v. N.Y., 36 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959).
95. Escobedo v. Ill., 378 U.S. 478, 489 (1964).
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may stir up additional controversy regarding this balance. 96
B. The A bout-Face of Chief Justice Burger
In his dissenting opinion in the Brewer 97 case, Chief Justice
Burger found the decision of the majority to be unbearable for
modern society.98 In that opinion he said, "In a variety of con-
texts we inquire whether application of the rule will promote its
objectives sufficiently to justify the enormous cost it imposes on
society."99 In addition, the Chief Justice has often objected to the
tremendous price society pays when dependable evidence is ex-
cluded in criminal trials.100 Yet, in the Henry case, the Chief Jus-
tice not only voted to extend the rights of the criminal defendant,
it was he who wrote the majority opinion. This change of direc-
tion for Chief Justice Burger must be viewed as a drastic one
when one considers the number of cases in which the Chief Jus-
tice voted not to extend the criminal defendant's rights.101
Many observers had forecast that the Burger Court would use
Henry to overrule the Massiah decision of the Warren Court.102
Despite the Justice Department's urging, under the Carter Ad-
ministration, that Massiah be overruled, and despite the con-
servative history of the Burger Court, the Court went ahead and
96. The decision handed down in Massiah, "shocked" law enforcement offi-
cials and prosecutors. J. KLo'rrER & J. KANovrrz, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR POLICE
378, 390 (3d ed. 1977).
97. 480 U.S. 387, 415 (1977).
98. Id. at 415.
99. Id. at 421-22.
100. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotic Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 413
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
101. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (right
to counsel at postindictment interrogations); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 1281
(1976) (joined in majority opinion) (no right to counsel at summary courtmartial
proceedings); Herring v. N.Y., 422 U.S. 835 (1975) (joined in dissenting opinion)
(cannot deny defense counsel to make closing argument in nonjury trial); Faretta
v. Cal., 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (right to self-representation at
felony trials); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (joined in majority opinion)
(no right to counsel at prison disciplinary hearing); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600
(1974) (joined in majority opinion) (no right to court-appointed counsel after first
appeal); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (joined in majority opinion) (no
right to counsel at postindictment photo displays); Kirby v. Ill., 406 U.S. 682 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (no right to counsel at preindictment lineup); Coleman
v. Ala., 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (right to counsel at preliminary
hearing).
102. Mann, supra note 3, at 15, col. 1.
extended the criminal defendant's right to counsel.103 In fact, the
Henry decision may have gone further than the Warren Court
would ever have gone. Consider the case of Miller v. California, a
case decided by the Warren Court, wherein the defendant's attor-
ney established a 24-hour-a-day watch of the defendant's cell to
prevent the government from interrogating the defendant.10 4 Law
enforcement officials sent an undercover agent into the defend-
ant's cell under the guise of a fellow inmate, and the informant re-
ceived information from the defendant which was admitted into
evidence at trial. The defendant was convicted, and the United
States Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Earl Warren, affirmed
that conviction.105
The shift in Chief Justice Burger's viewpoint is significant. But
whether or not that shift represents an indication of the Court's
direction in the future, regarding the defendant's right to counsel,
remains open to speculation.
C. The Future of the Government's Use of Informants
To many criminal law scholars and observers, the decision in
Henry is seen as an astounding jump for the Court.106 Professor
Kamisar,10 7 of the University of Michigan Law School stated that
the decision was a surprising one in terms of how far it went. 0 8
Most observers thought that, while the decision does not ban
the use of informants, it will probably force law enforcement offi-
cials to indict at later times and avoid the use of contingent fee
arrangements with informants. 09
103. Id. Only Justice Rehnquist gave support to overruling Massiah, 100 S. Ct.
at 2197.
104. 392 U.S. 616 (1968). In Miller, the defendant's husband was burned to
death in the automobile he and the defendant had been operating, and approxi-
mately twelve hours later the defendant was arrested and thereafter questioned.
The defendant claimed that the fire was an accident, whereas the government al-
leged that the fire had been purposely set by the defendant, and that she had mur-
dered her husband in order to collect insurance money and marry another man.
Id. at 616-17.
105. Id. What may have held the Warren Court back was the fact that the de-
fendant had not yet been formally charged with the crime. The dissent in Miller,
however, emphasized that, realistically, criminal proceedings had begun against
the defendant, and that the proceedings had stopped being a general inquiry be-
cause the unique facts of the case dictated that if a crime had been committed,
only the defendant could have done it. Id. at 624.
106. Mann, supra note 3, at 1, 15, col. 1.
107. See Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interro-
gation"? When Does It Matter? 67 GEO. L. REV. 1 (1978).
108. Mann, supra note 3, at 15, col. 1.
109. Id. at 15, col. 1. As long as no indictment has been filed, Henry is inappli-
cable. 100 S. Ct. at 2184. Thus, to further the availability of the use of informants,
law enforcement officials may postpone indictments so as to avoid conflicts with
Henry.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
It is evident that the Henry case represents more than a mere
application of the test conceived in Massiah. Through its inter-
pretation of the facts and consideration of the policies underlying
the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, the United States
Supreme Court, in the Henry case, in effect, gave its approval to a
statement once made by Hubert H. Humphrey: "We can not ex-
pect to breed respect for law and order among people who do not
share the fruits of ... freedom." 1 0 Quite possibly, the decision
in Henry, granting individuals additional rights under the consti-
tution when confronting the government, will have the ultimate
effect of inducing a greater respect for the laws of the United
States.
It is the opinion of this author that the United States Supreme
Court will be required to consider the Henry test in deciding fu-
ture cases regarding postindictment use of informants. The Court
will not be confined to the ruling in Massiah in deciding future
cases, for the reason that Henry has created a far more expansive
rule than that which was established in Massiah.
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